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Abstract:	 To	 fight	deflationary	pressures	 at	 the	 zero	 lower	bound,	 in	November	2013,	
the	Czech	National	Bank	(CNB)	introduced	a	one-sided	floor	on	the	exchange	rate,	as	an	
additional	monetary	policy	instrument.	This	paper	investigates	the	impact	of	the	FX	floor	
on	inflation	in	the	Czech	Republic,	by	comparing	actual	inflation	with	counterfactuals	in	
the	 absence	 of	 the	 exchange	 rate	 floor.	 Three	 different	 empirical	 strategies	 are	
implemented:	 an	 event	 study,	 difference-in-difference	 regressions	 and	 a	 synthetic	
control	 method.	 The	 empirical	 results	 provide	 evidence	 that	 the	 exchange	 rate	 was	
effective	 in	 fighting	 deflationary	 pressures	 and	 prevented	 inflation	 from	 going	 into	
negative	 territory.	 The	magnitude	of	 the	 effect	 ranges	between	0.5	 to	 1.5	percentage	
points.	The	results	are	robust	to	different	econometric	specifications.		
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1 Introduction 
When the global financial crisis unfolded and monetary policy rates 
came close to the zero lower bound (ZLB), it became clear that conventional 
monetary policies were not effective in loosening monetary conditions and 
supporting demand. Central banks started relying on less traditional 
instruments, or unconventional monetary policies (UMPs), to reach their 
targets. In the early stages of the crisis, UMPs were mainly targeted to 
restore market functioning, whereas measures to boost economic activity at 
the ZLB were adopted at later stages. Forward guidance, bonds purchases 
and negative interest rates are among the policies adopted by several 
central banks. Foreign exchange rate interventions constituted an 
alternative tool for small open economies to fight deflationary pressures 
(Lizal and Schwarz 2014).  
In November 2013, after a prolonged recession and hitting the zero lower 
bound, the Czech National Bank (CNB) decided to use the koruna exchange 
rate as an additional instrument of inflation targeting to ease monetary 
conditions, and to avoid deflation. The CNB introduced a one-sided 
exchange rate floor at a depreciated level of 27 Czech Koruna (CZK) to the 
euro to fulfill the inflation target, affecting the overall price level through 
higher import prices and inflation expectations. The adoption of the FX 
floor, as an additional tool of inflation targeting, is motivated by the 
literature on monetary policy at the zero lower bound, and particularly by 
the papers by Krugman (1998) and Svensson (2001). The latter advocates a 
combination of a price-level target, a devaluation of the currency and a 
temporary crawling peg to implement Krugman’s proposal, i.e. the credible 
promise by the central bank to be “irresponsible” in order to seek a higher 
future price level.  
In recent years, foreign exchange intervention operations have been 
implemented by central banks, both in advanced and emerging markets, 
especially with the objective of coping with large capital inflows. In 
September 2011, after a period of sharp appreciation, the Swiss National 
Bank (SNB) set a minimum exchange rate of 1.20 francs to the euro, 
announcing that it was prepared to buy foreign currency in unlimited 
quantities.1 In August 2013, The Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) announced a 
program of foreign exchange intervention to cope with the high volatility 
of the Brazilian real. Since 2008, the Bank of Israel (BOI) has also intervened 
in the foreign exchange market aiming to smooth excess volatility. The 
CNB, instead, carried out exchange rate interventions already in the past. 
                                                 
1  Wille, Klaus (6 September 2011). "Swiss Pledge Unlimited Currency Purchases". 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-09-06/swiss-national-bank-sets-
minimum-exchange-rate-of-1-20-against-the-euro 
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Since the adoption of the inflation targeting regime, the CNB has 
implemented FX interventions in three episodes, often trying to prevent 
appreciation of the exchange rate. The first intervention period took place 
between February and July 1998, the second between October 1999 and 
March 2000, and the third between October 2001 and September 2002 
(Lizak, and Schwarz 2014). Gersl and Holub (2006) review the Czech 
experience with foreign exchange interventions since 1998 and find limited 
impact on the koruna’s exchange rate and its volatility. Dominguez et al. 
(2013) study the impact of Czech reserves sales targeted to limit value losses 
of Euro-denominated assets and find evidence of an effect on the exchange 
rate level, only when sales are implemented on a daily basis.  
This paper analyzes whether the introduction of the exchange rate floor 
had managed in avoiding deflationary pressures in the Czech Republic. The 
question we want to answer is “what would have been the level of inflation 
if the CNB did not announce the exchange rate floor?” The analysis is 
complicated by the fact that we do not observe the counterfactual for the 
Czech inflation in the absence of the policy intervention. To overcome this 
problem, three empirical strategies, that aim at building a suitable 
counterfactual, are adopted. 
 As a starting point, we implement an event study around the time of 
the announcement of the floor. A standard New Keynesian Phillips curve 
for the Czech Republic is estimated on the pre-event sample and the 
forecasts subsequently used to measure the behavior of inflation due to the 
intervention. 
 We then investigate the effect of the adoption of the floor on different 
measures of inflation in a difference-in-difference framework. We test 
whether headline and core inflation in Czech Republic behave differently 
after November 2013 with respect to inflation in a control group of similar 
European countries. We also test for anticipatory effects and we document 
dynamic patterns of the effect. We estimate different specifications with 
multiple sets of fixed effects to ensure that omitted variables are controlled 
for. 
 Given the difficulties in constructing a good control group, we 
implement the methodology developed by Abadie et al. (2010) and we build 
a synthetic control group as a weighted average of other unaffected 
countries. This method focuses on the construction of a synthetic control 
group by searching for a combination of other units that are selected to 
match as close as possible the characteristics of the country affected by the 
treatment 
We find that the introduction of the FX floor worked in the desired 
direction, preventing headline inflation to go into negative territory. The 
result is robust across the three different methodologies and several 
robustness checks. The magnitude of the impact varies between 0.5 and 1.5 
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percentage points. We also find some evidence that the exchange rate floor 
had an impact on core inflation.2  
In general, the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of exchange rate 
interventions is relatively mixed.3 Older contributions, often focusing on 
advanced economies, find limited impact of FX interventions (Dominguez 
and Frankel (1990), Ghosh (1992), etc.). Motivated by the increased volatility 
in capital flows following the global crisis and the subsequent large 
exchange rate movements, a recent strand of the literature has been 
focusing on the so called macroeconomic management motive of foreign 
exchange rate intervention (Blanchard et al. 2015), with respect to the more 
traditional precautionary motive, to build-up liquidity as insurance against 
future shocks.4 Blanchard et al. 2015 exploit the exogenous character of 
capital inflows to a small open economy and estimate the response of 
foreign exchange intervention and other macro-variables with a VAR. 
Adler et al. (2015), in a panel setting and using instrumental variables, find 
evidence the interventions significantly affect the level of the exchange rate. 
In an earlier contribution, Adler and Tovar (2011) examine sterilized foreign 
exchange interventions in Latin America and confirm their effectiveness in 
mitigating appreciation pressures. Daude et al. (2014), using an error 
correction model, find that interventions are, on average, effective in 
moving the real exchange rate in the desired direction. Other papers try to 
break the contemporaneous relationship between exchange rate 
fluctuations and foreign exchange interventions using high frequency data. 
Fatum and Pedersen (2009) study the real-time effects of sterilized FX 
intervention using intraday intervention data from the Danish central bank. 
Rincon and Toro (2011) and Kamil (2008) estimate the effect of interventions 
on daily data in Colombia. Chamon et al. (2015) are the first to use synthetic 
                                                 
2 Other studies adopting this methodology include Billmeier and Nannicini (2013) who 
study the effect of economic liberalization, Cavallo et al. (2013) who assess the effect of 
natural disasters on economic growth and Heilmann (2016) who studies whether 
economic conflict hurts trade. 
3 For a comprehensive review of the literature see Sarno and Taylor (2001) and Menkhoff 
(2013). 
4  The effect of interventions with a precautionary scope are well established in the 
literature (Ghosh, et al., 2012; Jeanne and Ranciere, 2011; Aizenaman and Lee, 2008). 
Theoretical contributions on the macroeconomic management motive of foreign 
exchange rate interventions include: Benes et al. (2013), who extend a standard inflation 
targeting New-Keynesian small-open-economy model including foreign exchange rate 
interventions. Their framework incorporates “hybrid” IT regimes that include managed 
floats or crawling pegs, in which FX interventions can help insulate the economy 
against certain shocks, especially those to international financial conditions. Adler et al. 
(2016) find that the optimal magnitude of intervention is higher in monetary policy 
regimes with lower uncertainty. Cavallino (2016) investigates the desirability of foreign 
exchange intervention in response to currency misalignments with a New Keynesian 
model of a small open economy and imperfect financial markets. 
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control methods to investigate whether FX intervention in Brazil have been 
successful in mitigating depreciations pressures. Brůha and Tonner (2017) 
study the effect of the FX floor on the Czech economy with the official DSGE 
model of the CNB and different variants of the synthetic control method. 
They find that the introduction of the floor prevented core inflation to fall 
into negative territory, whereas the effect on other macro variables, while 
positive, is not statistically significant. 
In this paper, we follow a similar empirical strategy to that of Chamon et 
al. (2015), but we complement the analysis with a difference-in-difference 
estimation and several robustness checks. Moreover, we believe that the 
Czech experience constitutes an interesting case study per se, because of the 
nature of the exchange rate commitment that has been one-sided and at a 
depreciated exchange rate level. The paper is structured as follows. Section 
2 reviews the Czech experience with the exchange rate floor within the 
inflation targeting regime, Section 3 presents the data and Section 4 
discusses the empirical models and results. Section 5 concludes. 
2 The Exchange Rate Tool in the CNB’s IT Framework 
In November 2012, after a prolonged recession, the CNB brought its 
policy rate to technical zero (0.05 percent). However, this measure seemed 
to be insufficient to bring inflation back to its target. In November 2013, the 
central bank decided that further monetary easing was needed to boost 
growth. Quantitative easing through government bond purchases had little 
scope, since banks were already experiencing surpluses in long-term 
liquidity. Similarly, qualitative easing did not seem an appropriate solution 
given the small market for riskier securities in the country. 5  For these 
reasons the CNB decided to introduce a one-sided exchange rate floor at 
CZK 27 to the euro to depreciate the currency and offset deflationary risks. 
On November 7, 2013, the CNB made the following statement: "The Bank 
Board also decided to start using the exchange rate as an additional instrument for 
easing the monetary conditions. The CNB will intervene on the foreign exchange 
market to weaken the koruna so that the exchange rate of the koruna against the 
euro is close to CZK 27". The CNB allows the exchange rate to freely float on 
the weaker side of the FX floor. The FX interventions to support the 
commitment are implemented without the need for an additional decision 
of the CNB Board. 
Given permanent deflationary pressures, in several subsequent 
occasions the FX floor horizon was extended. On December 17 2013 the 
Bank Board communicated that the CNB would keep the exchange rate 
                                                 
5 See Franta et al. (2014) and Alichi et al. (2015). 
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close to CZK 27/EUR at least until the start of 2015. The CNB 
communicated that it would exit this unconventional regime once inflation 
is back to its desired target. On December 17 2014 the CNB communicated 
that it would not discontinue the use of the exchange rate as a monetary 
policy instrument before 2016.6 At its most recent meeting on February 2 
2017, the Bank Board confirmed that the CNB would not discontinue the 
use of the exchange rate as a monetary policy instrument before the second 
quarter of 2017. The Bank Board confirmed the CNB’s commitment to 
intervene on the foreign exchange market, if needed, to weaken the 
currency so that the exchange rate of the koruna is kept close to CZK 27 to 
the euro. The extension of the exchange rate floor was justified by inflation 
forecasts that will sustainably fulfil the 2% target in the first half of this 
year.7 
Crucial to this “augmented” inflation targeting framework is the 
communication strategy adopted by the CNB. The key ingredient to 
successfully guide inflation expectations, without de-anchoring long-term 
expectations, is that the exchange rate tool is perceived as a temporary 
instrument (Alichi et al. 2015). The immediate reaction of the public to the 
introduction of the floor was mostly critical. The change in policy was seen 
as unexpected and as a source of uncertainty for the corporate and financial 
sector. The CNB had to change its communications strategy providing 
details on monetary policy decisions to the public on the day following the 
monetary policy meeting.8 
Figure 1 shows the exchange rate path and FX interventions by the CNB 
since 2011. The day of the announcement, the exchange rate of the Czech 
koruna with the euro moved from 25.8 to close to 27 right after the 
announcement of the floor, trading at the end of the day at almost exactly 
27. Interventions in the FX market have been limited since November 2013, 
but the Koruna has been strengthening and moving close to the floor in 
recent years. Starting in the summer of 2015, a strengthening of the koruna 
coincided with higher interventions. 
                                                 
6 The shift of the hard-commitment until the end of 2015 had been communicated already 
at the end of July 2014. 
7 https://www.cnb.cz/en/monetary_policy/bank_board_minutes/2017/170202_prohlas
eni.html. 
8  These communications improvements include: written statement by the Bank Board 
published after the press conference on the day of the monetary policy meeting, a 
summary of the Inflation report published the day after the Board meeting, a dedicated 
page to the exchange rate commitment on the CNB website, etc. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of CNB FX Operations    
 
3 Data and Stylized Facts 
The empirical analysis is based on the estimation of an open-economy 
new Keynesian Phillips curve, in which the standard inflation-
unemployment relationship is augmented to account for imported 
inflation. The specification of the empirical model builds on Iossifov and 
Podpiera (2014), who show that food and energy prices, together with taxes 
and movements in administered prices have an important role in explaining 
headline inflation across CESEE non-euro countries since 2011. They also 
find that disinflation in the euro area significantly impacted countries with 
an exchange-rate target and inflation targeters that have a high share of 
foreign value added in their domestic demand. In their empirical model, 
imported inflation is decomposed into the impact of the nominal effective 
exchange rate, world food and oil prices, and core inflation in the euro area. 
The sample includes 14 countries from 2006Q1 to 2015Q3.9 Table 1 presents 
the summary statistics for the sample including the Czech Republic. All 
variables are expressed in 12-month growth rates. Inflation is computed 
using the Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices (HICP) published by 
Eurostat. Commodity price changes are captured by world oil and food 
                                                 
9 For more details on sources and construction of the variables see Iossifov and Podpiera 
(2014) and the Appendix (Table A1). The sample includes: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
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price indices in US dollars multiplied by the weights of energy and food in 
the consumer baskets. The cyclical unemployment rate is extracted with the 
Baxter-King bandpass filter. The impact of taxes and administered prices is 
captured by their contribution to headline inflation. Inflation expectations 
are at one-year horizon. Price pressures from the euro area are proxied by 
euro area core inflation multiplied by the share of foreign value added in 
domestic demand. 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Headline inflation 585 0.028 0.028 -0.039 0.175 
Core inflation 585 0.019 0.020 -0.049 0.111 
Oil price 585 0.009 0.045 -0.089 0.150 
Food price 585 0.009 0.045 -0.089 0.150 
Unemployment gap 585 -0.001 0.014 -0.049 0.062 
Administered prices 585 0.007 0.007 -0.014 0.042 
Taxes 585 0.005 0.009 -0.030 0.060 
Inflation expectations - 1 year ahead 495 0.025 0.012 -0.023 0.091 
Core inflation in the EA 585 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.013 
 
 
Figure 2. Headline and Core Inflation (percent) 
 
Note. The green line plots headline inflation and the orange line core inflation. The red vertical line 
corresponds to the introduction of the FX floor. Both series are from Eurostat. 
 
Figure 2 plots headline and core inflation for the Czech Republic and 
shows that both series reverted their downward trend after the introduction 
Caselli: Did the Exchange Rate Floor Prevent Deflation in the Czech Republic? 
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/252 9 
of the floor. However, headline inflation has been moving very close to zero 
since the beginning of 2015. Interestingly, import price inflation presents a 
clear upward trend after the introduction of the floor, giving a first 
indication that the new policy might have worked through higher price of 
imports (Figure 3).10 
 
Figure 3. Import Price Inflation (percent) 
 
Note. The blue line plots import price inflation from the Czech Statistical Office. The red vertical 
line corresponds to the introduction of the FX floor. 
4 Empirical Methodologies 
The question we want to answer in the empirical section is: what would 
have been the level of the Czech inflation in the absence of the FX floor? The 
analysis is complicated by the fact that we do not observe the counterfactual 
and given the difficulties in building a good counterfactual when macro 
policies are involved, we adopt three different empirical strategies. 
 An event study that uses the pre-intervention sample to build a 
model to forecast inflation in the absence of the FX floor. 
 A difference-in-difference regression analysis that compares the 
evolution of inflation in the Czech Republic with a control group of similar 
countries.  
                                                 
10  Import prices are from the Czech Statistical Office, downloaded through Haver 
Analytics. 
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 A synthetic control method that exploits the statistical proprieties of 
the data to choose a control group that best matches the pre-treatment 
characteristics of the treated country. 
4.1 An Event Study Approach 
We start the empirical analysis with a simple approach the aims at 
measuring the behavior of inflation due to the policy change. More 
specifically, we estimate the following regression on the pre-intervention 
sample. 
 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝜋𝑡−1  + 𝛾𝜋𝑡−2 +  𝛿𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡 + 𝜃𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑡 +  𝜙𝑢𝑡 +  𝜆𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑡 +
 𝜇𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡 + 𝜈𝜋𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑡 + 𝜓𝐸𝐴𝜋𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡   
(1) 
 
where 𝜋𝑡  is Czech headline inflation, 𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡  and 𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑡  are world oil and 
food prices respectively, multiplied by the Czech Republic’s share of energy 
and food in the CPI basket, 𝑢𝑡  is the unemployment gap, 𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑡   and 
𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡  are the contribution of taxes and administered prices to headline 
inflation respectively, and 𝐸𝐴𝜋𝑡 is the Euro Area core inflation weighted 
by the share of foreign value added in domestic demand.11 With respect to 
the baseline model in Iossifov and Podpiera (2014), we omit the nominal 
exchange rate since it is directly impacted by policy intervention. 12  We 
estimate this model over the sample up to 2013Q4 (excluded), the time of 
the introduction of the floor and we obtain predicted values for inflation.13 
The latter describes the behavior of inflation in the absence of the policy 
change. The regression has an R-squared of 0.91, showing a relatively good 
fit.14 
                                                 
11 The unemployment gap is given by the cyclical component of the unemployment rate 
extracted with the Baxter-King bandpass filter (see Iossifov and Podpiera, 2014). 
12 For consistency with the model estimated with difference-in-difference regression and 
synthetic control we omit the exchange rate, which is the objective of the policy 
intervention. As mentioned in Campos et al. (2014), the choice of the pre-treatment 
characteristics should include variables that can approximate the path of the treated 
country, but should not include variables that anticipate the effects of the intervention. 
As a robustness, however, we augment the baseline with the rate of depreciation of the 
exchange rate and the results are very much in line with what we obtain omitting the 
exchange rate. 
13 The sample starts in 2007Q3. 
14 The results of the Phillips curve estimates are presented in the Appendix – Table A2. 
Euro area inflation and taxes explain almost completely the evolution of inflation in the 
Czech Republic. This is also in line with the results of Iossifov and Podpiera (2014), who 
show, in a sample of Eastern European countries, that inflation spillovers from the euro 
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The results suggest that the introduction of the floor might have helped 
in keeping inflation above zero. Figure 4 contrasts the time series of inflation 
with the predicted value obtained from the previous regression. We observe 
that, after the introduction of the floor, the two series diverge, with the 
forecast trending down into negative territory. This suggests that, without 
the introduction of the policy, inflation would have moved into negative 
territory. However, the difference between the predicted and actual 
inflation is rather small. 
 
Figure 4. Predicted and Actual Inflation (percent) 
 
Note. The blue line plots actual headline inflation in the Czech Republic and the red line plots the 
predicted values from the New Keynesian Phillips curve estimated up to the introduction of the 
floor. The black vertical line corresponds to the introduction of the FX floor. 
 
Figure 5 shows this metric and the corresponding confidence intervals 
(at 90, 95 and 99 percent) and we observe that the effect of the introduction 
becomes significant towards the beginning of 2015 (with a 95 percent 
confidence interval). This is some suggestive but not conclusive evidence 
that the exchange rate floor worked in the desired direction to offset 
deflation risks. As a robustness, we augment the baseline with the nominal 
exchange rate. The results are shown in Figure 6. Inflation in the absence of 
the FX floor trends into negative territory, confirming the previous finding. 
                                                 
area are particularly large in the Czech Republic, where the share of domestically 
consumed foreign value-added is particularly high. 
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Figure 5. Difference Between Predicted and Actual Inflation (percent) 
 
Note. The solid green line reports the difference between the predicted and actual headline 
inflation. The dashed and dotted lines plot different confidence intervals around the estimates.  
 
Figure 6. Predicted and Actual Inflation – Augmented Baseline (percent) 
 
Note. The blue line plots actual headline inflation in the Czech Republic and the red line plots the 
predicted values of the New Keynesian Phillips curve estimated up to the introduction of the floor 
and augmented with the nominal exchange rate. The black vertical line corresponds to the 
introduction of the FX floor. 
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4.2 A Difference-in-difference Approach 
In this section, we adopt a difference-in-difference methodology, which 
is well suited to estimate the impact of a policy change on a treated group 
i.e. a group exposed to a certain policy. A simple way to evaluate the effect 
of a policy is to compare outcomes before and after the intervention for a 
group affected by the change (Treated Group) to a group not affected by the 
change (Control Group).15 𝑌𝐶𝑍𝐸  denotes inflation in Czech Republic (the 
treated country) and 𝑌𝑖  inflation in another country, not affected by the 
policy intervention (the control group). The DD estimate (𝛿𝐷𝐷) of the effect 
of the introduction of the exchange rate floor in Czech Republic is: 
 
𝛿𝐷𝐷 = (𝑌𝐶𝑍𝐸𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑌𝐶𝑍𝐸𝑝𝑟𝑒) − (𝑌𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑌𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑝𝑟𝑒)   (2) 
 
where pre and post denotes periods before and after the introduction of 
the floor, respectively. The difference in difference (or "double difference") 
estimator is defined as the difference in the average outcome in the 
treatment group before and after the treatment minus the difference in the 
average outcome in the control group before and after treatment. The 
difference-in-difference (DD) estimate is an unbiased estimate of the effect 
of the policy changes if, absent the policy change, the average changes in 
𝑌𝐶𝑍𝐸  – 𝑌𝑖  would have been the same for treatment and controls. This is 
equivalent to saying that the treated and the control group should follow 
parallel paths before the intervention. We first check this assumption by 
plotting the evolution of inflation in the Czech Republic vis-à-vis the 
average inflation in the rest of the countries in the sample. 
Inflation in the Czech Republic and in the control group followed parallel 
trends before the introduction of the exchange rate floor (Figure 7). This is 
even true if we restrict the analysis to the period after the global financial 
crisis. This stylized fact is supportive of the idea that the countries we 
choose might form a good control group to study the policy introduction in 
a difference-in-difference framework. We will also control more formally 
for pre-treatment parallel trends in the regression analysis. Another 
interesting point that emerges from Figure 7 is that average inflation in the 
control group has been lower than in Czech Republic after 2013Q4, the date 
of the introduction of the exchange rate floor. This provides evidence in 
support of the hypothesis that the introduction of the exchange rate floor 
might have prevented inflation from going into negative territory.16 
                                                 
15 See for instance Angrist and Pischke (2009). 
16 According to the CPI compiled by the Czech Statistical Office, inflation never moved 
into negative territory. In the estimation, however, Eurostat’s HICP was employed to 
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We will now test this hypothesis by estimating the following equation. 
 
𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝜋𝑡−2 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑖 +  𝛾𝑡 +  𝛿𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡  +  𝜖𝑖𝑡   (3) 
 
where 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖  is a dummy variable indicating the Czech Republic and 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡  is a dummy indicating quarters from 2013Q4 onwards.
17 The DD 
estimate is given by the coefficient 𝛿  that captures the effect of the 
introduction of the exchange rate floor on inflation. The vector  𝑋𝑖𝑡 
includes the control variables used in the previous estimation. Table 2 and 
Figure 8 presents the results of different specifications. We also introduce 
different sets of fixed effects and we restrict the analysis to non-Euro Area 
countries since we want to exclude countries that introduced similar 
policies (an exchange rate peg) during the sample period.18 We cluster the 
standard errors at the country level to allow for correlated shocks as 
suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004). The specifications with country and 
time fixed effects (Column 1 and 2) should be considered as conservative, 
since they identify the effect of the policy change exploiting within country 
variation, controlling for global shocks. As robustness, we explicitly include 
in the regressions pre-intervention country-specific time trends country-
specific time trends (Column 3 to 6) to control for the parallel-trend 
assumption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
ensure comparability across countries. This latter series show a slightly negative value 
in 2015q1, equal to -.000273. 
17  The dummies 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖  and 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡  are captured by fixed effects and therefore not 
included in the estimation. 
18 The fixed effects estimation of models with lagged dependent variable can produce 
biased estimates. The bias (equal to 1/T) is an issue for short panels, but disappears as 
T. In our sample we have T=39, so the fixed effects estimator is likely to perform at 
least as well as many alternatives. To check the robustness of our results, however, we 
also estimate the baseline model with a GMM estimator with robust standard errors. 
The coefficient of the on the interaction is equal to 0.07, consistent with the fixed effects 
estimation. Fixed effects results with dynamic panels are generally downward biased.  
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Table 2. Baseline Results  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Inflation Inflation Inflation Inflation Inflation Inflation 
FX floor 0.005* 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.015*** 0.003 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Inflation t-1 -0.327*** -0.287** -0.318*** -0.275*** -0.356*** -0.250*** 
 (0.040) (0.087) (0.061) (0.077) (0.059) (0.067) 
Inflation t-2 0.937*** 0.849*** 0.908*** 0.798*** 0.836*** 0.671*** 
 (0.048) (0.128) (0.089) (0.109) (0.097) (0.107) 
Unemployment gap -0.098*** 0.160* -0.111 0.216* -0.180* 0.596** 
 (0.037) (0.070) (0.072) (0.114) (0.090) (0.187) 
Price of oil -0.058 0.017 -0.062 0.031 0.002 0.075 
 (0.044) (0.058) (0.039) (0.068) (0.043) (0.079) 
Price of food 0.062** 0.001 0.072 0.001 0.048 -0.038 
 (0.030) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.041) 
Inflation expectation 0.386*** 0.445*** 0.387*** 0.480*** 0.342*** 0.313** 
 (0.055) (0.101) (0.110) (0.111) (0.108) (0.115) 
Contribution admin. prices 0.488*** 0.233*** 0.526*** 0.200 0.644*** 0.438*** 
 (0.082) (0.067) (0.111) (0.116) (0.081) (0.063) 
Contribution of taxes 0.200*** 0.290*** 0.202*** 0.308*** 0.222*** 0.419*** 
 (0.043) (0.051) (0.043) (0.040) (0.048) (0.054) 
EA inflation -0.209 5.264** -0.254 7.756* 0.983 9.911*** 
 (0.654) (2.196) (1.366) (3.491) (1.623) (2.882) 
Observations 462 297 462 297 462 297 
R-squared 0.952 0.937 0.954 0.941 0.960 0.952 
Number of id 14 9 14 9 14 9 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pre country spec. TT NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Country spec. TT NO NO NO NO YES   YES 
Sample Full No EMU Full No EMU Full No EMU 
Note. Clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
The NO-EMU sub-sample excludes Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovenia. 
The dummies TREAT and POST are absorbed by fixed effects. FX floor is the product of the TREAT 
and POST dummies. 
 
The control variables have the expected sign and magnitude. The 
interaction term is positive and significant across the first four 
specifications, suggesting that inflation in the Czech Republic has been 
higher than in the control group after the introduction of the exchange rate 
floor. The magnitude of the effect varies (between 0.5 to 1.5 percentage 
points), but in the baseline model (Column1) the coefficient on the 
interaction term indicates that the introduction of the floor brought inflation 
up by 0.5 percentage points in Czech Republic with respect to the control 
group (see Figure 8 for a visual interpretation of the results).  
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Figure 7. Inflation in the Czech Republic vs Other Countries (percent) 
 
Note. The green line plots the average headline inflation in the sample and the orange line plots 
headline inflation in the Czech Republic. The red vertical line corresponds to the introduction of 
the FX floor. 
 
Figure 8. Difference-in-difference Estimates 
 
Note. The blue bars report the coefficients on the interaction term (FX floor) from the six different 
models presented in Table 2. The black lines correspond to 95 percent confidence intervals 
calculated with clustered standard errors at the country level. 
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This finding suggests than in absence of the floor inflation would have 
been between 0.5 and 1.5 percentage points lower.  
The baseline includes country and quarterly fixed effects to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity at the country level and for idiosyncratic global 
shocks, partially reducing concerns of endogeneity. The effect remains 
significant when we restrict the sample to non-EMU countries (Column 2) 
to exclude countries that have adopted similar policies to the one of the 
Czech Republic (Slovakia adopted the euro in 2009, for instance). As a 
robustness check, Column (3) and (4) explicitly controls for the parallel 
trend assumption, including pre-treatment country specific time trends. 
The coefficient on the interaction is still positive and significant. Finally, 
column (5) and (6) show the results of a specification with country-specific 
time trends: the effect of the interaction is still positive but not significant. 
This result might suggest that after the introduction of the floor, countries 
in the control group and the Czech Republic have been exposed to different 
shocks and the divergence in inflation path is not only explained by the FX 
floor. It is also plausible that this specification might be too taxing for 
country-level data.  
A useful exercise, that might help understand whether the observed 
increase in inflation in the Czech Republic is indeed driven by the 
introduction of the FX floor and not by other confounding factors, is to test 
for anticipatory effects. This is easily done introducing in the regression 
leads of the treatment, as proposed by Autor (2003).19 Leads are simple 
interactions between the time fixed effects at different time horizons relative 
to the introduction of the floor and the treated country (a dummy equal to 
one for the Czech Republic). If there are no anticipatory effects of the 
introduction of the policy change, we would expect all the leads to be 
insignificant. Adding the lags of the treatment allows instead to trace the 
dynamic impact of the policy intervention. It is plausible to think that the 
impact of the exchange rate floor might take some time to materialize.  
To test for anticipatory effects, we thus code four lead variables, which 
take the value 1 only in the four quarters before the floor introduction, and 
0 otherwise. For post-FX floor introduction dynamics, we augment the 
baseline with 4 lag variables that take the value 1 from one quarter after the 
FX floor introduction to four quarters after the introduction, and 0 
otherwise. Figure 9 and Table 3 reports the coefficients on the leads and lags 
from column 5.  
 
 
                                                 
19 For a similar exercise see also Gehring and Schneider (2015). 
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Table 3. Leads and Lags  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Inflation Inflation Inflation Inflation Inflation Inflation 
FX floor t-1 0.003 0.006 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
FX floor t-2 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.003* 0.003 0.003 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
FX floor t-3 0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 -0.007 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
FX floor t-4 0.002* 0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.006 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
FX floor t=0 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
FX floor t+1 -0.000 0.004 0.008* 0.016* -0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) 
FX floor t+2 0.005*** 0.008** 0.013*** 0.020** 0.004 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) 
FX floor t+3 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.024*** 0.007** 0.006 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) 
Constant -0.000 -0.047** 0.006 -0.052* 0.012 -0.031 
 (0.010) (0.019) (0.011) (0.025) (0.015) (0.025)        
Observations 406 261 406 261 406 261 
R-squared 0.953 0.937 0.955 0.942 0.959 0.955 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pre country spec. TT NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Country spec. TT NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Sample Full No EMU Full No EMU Full No EMU 
Note. Clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
The NO-EMU sub-sample excludes Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovenia. The dummies 
TREAT and POST are absorbed by fixed effects. Interaction is the product of the TREAT and POST 
dummies. Control variables are not shown. The effect at t+4 is dropped.  
 
We do not observe anticipatory effects when we control for country 
specific time trends (Figure 9 – Column 5 and 6 of Table 3), but less 
conservative specifications show some signs that the introduction of the FX 
floor has been anticipated.20 The instability of the results does not come out 
as a surprise since the CNB started communicating the potential use of the 
FX floor as early as September 2012.21 
 
                                                 
20 To further exclude the possibility that the introduction of the FX floor has been picked-
up by inflation expectations, we estimate a regression with inflation expectations on the 
LHS. The results on the interaction term are not significant, suggesting that the FX floor 
did not have an impact on expectations. We also implement a static version of the 
baseline model, and the results are stable across specifications. 
21 Franta et al. (2014). 
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Figure 9. Leads and Lags   
 
 
We perform the same exercise using core inflation as the dependent 
variable.22 We estimate a more parsimonious version of the augmented 
New Keynesian Phillips curve that excludes volatile components (world oil 
and food prices, administered prices and the contribution of taxes). This 
exercise confirms the previous result that the introduction of the floor 
contributed to prevent disinflation in the Czech Republic.  
Table 4 and Figure 10 show that the effect of the interaction term is 
similar in terms of magnitude to the one estimated for headline inflation. 
The coefficient is significant across the first five specifications with values 
ranging from 0.1 to 0.6 percentage points.  
 
                                                 
22 Core inflation data are from Eurostat, downloaded through Haver. The countries and 
time periods are the same as in the previous estimation. 
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Figure 10. Difference-in-difference estimation – core inflation 
 
Note: The blue bars plot the coefficients on the interaction term (FX floor) from the six different 
models presented in Table 4. The black lines correspond to 95 percent confidence intervals 
calculated with clustered standard errors at the country level.  
 
The different exercises implemented in this section suggest a small, but 
positive and significant impact on the introduction of the FX floor on 
headline inflation. In this case, the results are generally robust across 
different specifications. The findings for core inflation are more mixed, but 
still reveal a positive effect, that is however less robust. As a final step of 
our analysis we now turn to the synthetic control method estimation to 
build an alternative control group. 
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Table 4. Core Inflation Results  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Core 
inflation 
Core 
inflation 
Core 
inflation 
Core 
inflation 
Core 
inflation 
Core 
inflation 
              
FX floor 0.00150** 0.00306* 0.00346*** 0.00685** 0.00343** 0.00496 
 (0.000508) (0.00147) (0.000705) (0.00257) (0.00155) (0.00271) 
Core inflation t-1 1.104*** 1.030*** 1.085*** 0.987*** 1.032*** 0.937*** 
 (0.0816) (0.0769) (0.0840) (0.0578) (0.0809) (0.0635) 
Core inflation t-2 -0.334*** -0.300*** -0.331*** -0.290*** -0.360*** -0.322*** 
 (0.0537) (0.0403) (0.0530) (0.0290) (0.0586) (0.0291) 
Unemployment gap -0.0553 0.0409 -0.0634 0.0474 -0.120** 0.107 
 (0.0363) (0.0655) (0.0446) (0.0930) (0.0470) (0.112) 
Inflation exp. 0.291*** 0.404*** 0.296*** 0.446*** 0.265*** 0.443** 
 (0.0630) (0.117) (0.0700) (0.112) (0.0736) (0.145) 
EA inflation 0.623* 2.428 0.714 3.559 1.796* 3.334 
 (0.308) (1.576) (0.481) (2.465) (0.907) (2.681) 
Observations 462 297 462 297 462 297 
R-squared 0.939 0.915 0.941 0.919 0.946 0.926 
Number of id 14 9 14 9 14 9 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pre country spec. TT NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Country spec. TT NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Sample Full No EMU Full No EMU Full No EMU 
Note. Clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The NO-EMU sub-sample excludes Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovenia. The dummies 
TREAT and POST are absorbed by fixed effects. FX floor is the product of the TREAT and POST 
dummies.  
 
4.3 A Synthetic Method Approach 
As highlighted in the previous section, the common-trend assumption 
should be validated for the difference-in-difference methodology to work. 
A crucial element to ensure this assumption is the choice of an appropriate 
control group. The synthetic control method is a semi-parametric approach 
that allows to improve on the difference-in-difference in building the right 
control group. While in a standard difference-in-difference estimation the 
control group is built as a simple average of the characteristics of similar 
countries, the synthetic control method uses a weighted average of the set 
of controls. More specifically, it focuses on the construction of a synthetic 
control group by searching for a combination of other units that are chosen 
to match as close as possible the pre-treatment characteristics of the country 
affected by the intervention.  
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Abadie et al. (2010) study the effect of California’s 1988 tobacco control 
program on cigarettes’ consumption.23 They demonstrate that, following 
the approval of Proposition 99, cigarettes’ sales in California dropped 
significantly relative to a comparable synthetic control region. Suppose we 
observe 𝐽 +  1  region, but only region 1 (California) receives the 
treatment (i.e. Proposition 99). We observe each region in time periods 𝑡 =
1, … , 𝑇. Region 1 receives the treatment from period 𝑇0  +  1 until time 
𝑇. 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝐼   is the outcome of the treated unit 𝑖 after the treatment at 𝑡 ≥ 𝑇0. 
𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁  is the potential outcome we would observe for region 𝑖 at time 𝑡 if 
region 1 never receives the treatment. The problem is that we do not observe 
𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁   (the counterfactual). If we assume that the treatment has no impact 
before period 𝑇0  +  1, then the average effect on the treated unit is 𝛼𝑖𝑡 =
𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝐼 − 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁. We aim to estimate  𝛼1𝑇0+1, … , 𝛼1𝑇. Since 𝑌1𝑡
𝐼  is observed we just 
have to estimate 𝑌1𝑡
𝑁. Suppose that 𝑌1𝑡
𝑁 is given by the following model: 
 
𝑌i𝑡
𝑁 = δt + θtZi + λtμi + ϵit       (4) 
 
where Zi  is a vector of observed covariates (not affected by the 
intervention). Let 𝑊 = (𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝑗+1)′ be a (𝐽𝑋1) vector of positive weights 
that sum to one. Then any such 𝑊 represents a potential synthetic control. 
For a given 𝑊, the value of the outcome at time t is: 
 
∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑦𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜽𝑡
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
∑ 𝑤𝑗𝒁𝒊 +
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
∑ 𝑤𝑗𝝁𝒊 + ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝜺𝒋𝒕
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
 (5) 
 
The optimal weights 𝑾∗ satisfy: 
 
∑ wj
*
J+1
j=2
 yj1=y11 ,   ∑ wj
*
J+1
j=2
 yj2=y12    , …,  ∑ wj
*
J+1
j=2
 yjT0=y1T0  and ∑ wj
*
J+1
j=2
 Zj=Z1  (6) 
 
Then we can choose W to minimize: 
 
‖𝑋1 − 𝑋0𝑾‖ = √(𝑋1 − 𝑋0𝑾)′𝑉(𝑋1 − 𝑋0𝑾) (7) 
 
We use the previous specification to build a synthetic counterfactual for 
the Czech inflation in absence of the exchange rate floor. Again, we exclude 
                                                 
23 Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) estimate the effects of the terrorist conflict in the Basque 
Country on the Basque economy using other Spanish regions as a comparison group. 
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from the estimation the nominal exchange rate since it is the instrument of 
the policy and therefore it is impacted directly by the treatment. To 
maximize the fit in the pre-treatment period we tried several specifications. 
All of them are based on the previous New Keynesian Phillips curve, but 
the one that shows the best fit includes six quarters of lagged inflation 
(2009Q3, 2010Q1, 2011Q2, 2012Q1, 2012Q3, 2013Q3). This specification 
shows a better fit than the one that includes the average of lagged inflation 
calculated over the whole pre-treatment. The root mean squared error 
(RMSPE) is 0.007. Inflation prior to the introduction of the exchange rate 
floor is best replicated by a combination of Denmark, Slovenia and Slovakia 
(Table 5).  
 
Table 5. Weights for the Synthetic Control Group 
BGR 0 
HRV 0 
DNK 0.108 
EST 0 
HUN 0 
LVA 0.06 
LTU 0 
POL 0 
ROU 0 
SVK 0.154 
SVN 0.679 
SWE 0 
GBR 0 
 
Table 6 compares the pre-treatment characteristics of the actual Czech 
Republic and the synthetic one. The synthetic series accurately reproduces 
the values of inflation and its predictors for Czech Republic prior to the 
treatment (Figure 11). The magnitude of the effect is similar to the one 
obtained with the difference-in-difference estimation. The introduction of 
the FX increased headline inflation by between 0.4 and 1.1 percentage 
points, depending on the time horizon. 
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Table 6. Comparison of the Actual and Synthetic Series 
 Treated Synthetic 
Inflation 2009:Q3 -0.001188 0.000939 
Inflation 2010:Q1 0.003548 0.011439 
Inflation 2011:Q2 0.018430 0.025724 
Inflation 2012:Q1 0.039907 0.028069 
Inflation 2012:Q3 0.034375 0.030992 
Inflation 2013:Q3 0.012184 0.017087 
Oil price 0.020653 0.020460 
Food price 0.025828 0.020999 
Unemployment gap -0.000493 -0.000916 
Contribution of administered prices 0.009056 0.005050 
Contribution of taxes 0.008481 0.004049 
Inflation expectations 0.024748 0.024924 
 
One of the caveats of the synthetic control method is that it does not 
provide standard errors to assess whether the results are statistically 
significant. To overcome this issue, we implement a placebo test to detect 
wrongful inference. The rationale for placebo experiments is to test whether 
the estimated impact of the treatment could be driven entirely by chance. 
Following Abadie et al. (2010), we estimate the same model allowing all the 
other countries to be treated in 2013Q4.24 We would expect, if the control 
group countries are indeed not affected by the policy change, not to find 
any large deviations in inflation after the introduction of the floor. In Figure 
12 we plot the gap between actual and synthetic inflation for the Czech 
Republic and all the other “fake” synthetic series. In the pre-treatment 
sample, the synthetic series displays a relatively good fit, given that the 
difference between the two series is close to zero. We also notice a positive, 
but small effect of the introduction of the FX floor on inflation. However, 
the divergence with respect to other countries is not extreme and some 
fluctuations of similar magnitude are presents even in the pre-treatment 
sample. This again suggests the presence of some effect of the FX floor on 
inflation with relatively small magnitudes, consistent with the results from 
the event study and the difference-in-difference estimation. 
                                                 
24 For a similar approach see also Billmeier and Nannicini, (2013), Chamon et al. (2015), 
Heilmann (2016), Adhikari et al. (2016) and Swarnali (2016). 
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Figure 11. Synthetic Control Estimates 
 
Note. The black line plots headline inflation for the Czech Republic and the red line plots the 
synthetic control series, which corresponds to inflation in the absence of the FX floor. The black 
vertical line corresponds to the introduction of the FX floor. 
 
Figure 12. Placebo Test for Headline Inflation 
 
Note. The red line plots the gap in inflation (difference between actual and synthetic inflation) in 
the Czech Republic. The grey lines plot the same metric for all the others unit treated in the placebo 
exercise. A positive number corresponds to a positive effect of the introduction of the floor on 
inflation. The red vertical line corresponds to the introduction of the FX floor. 
-.
0
4
-.
0
2
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
G
a
p
 i
n
 I
n
fl
a
ti
o
n
2006q1 2008q3 2011q1 2013q3 2016q1
time
Placebo states CZE
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS Vol. 8, Issue 2, Fall-Winter 2017, Article 1 
 
Copyright © 2017 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved. 
 
26 
Figure 13. Synthetic Control for Inflation – Non-EMU Sample 
 
Note. The black line plots headline inflation for the Czech Republic and the red line plots the 
synthetic control series, which corresponds to inflation in the absence of the FX floor excluding 
countries in the EMU. The black vertical line corresponds to the introduction of the FX floor. 
 
In a robustness, consistently with the difference-in-difference estimation, 
we also exclude countries that joined the euro in the estimation period. The 
rationale is to exclude countries that were affected by similar policies 
during the estimation sample. A similar pattern to the full sample 
estimation emerges, however the fit of the synthetic series is poorer. The 
root mean squared error is still relatively low, equal to 0.009. The pre-
intervention inflation is best reproduced by a combination of Bulgaria, 
Croatia and Denmark (Table 7). 
Table 7. Country Weights 
BGR 0.115 
HRV 0.407 
DNK 0.477 
HUN 0 
POL 0 
ROU 0 
SWE 0 
GBR 0 
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5 Conclusions  
To fight deflationary pressures at the zero lower bound, in November 
2013, the Czech National Bank introduced a one-sided floor on the exchange 
rate, as an additional monetary policy instrument. This paper has analyzed 
the impact of the introduction of the floor on inflation. The question we 
have been asking is: “what would have been the level of inflation in absence 
of the policy intervention?”. To build a suitable counterfactual, and given 
the difficulties in estimating treatment effects in macroeconomics, we 
adopted three different strategies: an event study approach, a difference-in-
difference regression and the synthetic control method.  
All estimation results suggest that the introduction of the floor prevented 
Czech inflation from going into negative territory, thus enabling the central 
bank to achieve the goal of fighting deflationary pressures. The estimated 
effect is economically and statistically significant for both headline and core 
inflation with values ranging between 0.5 to 1.5 percentage points. The 
empirical analysis also supports the idea that the floor had a gradual impact 
on inflation.  
These findings suggest that the CNB policy has been successful in 
affecting the overall price level through higher import prices and inflation 
expectations, following Svensson (2001) proposal to escape from a liquidity 
trap. Even though these results are clearly particularly relevant for the 
Czech Republic, we can interpret them as suggestive that foreign exchange 
interventions represent a meaningful monetary policy tool for other small-
open economies, that do no not face significant liquidity problems. Further 
research could explicitly investigate the transmission channels, testing, for 
instance, the impact of the FX floor on imports and exports prices. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Variables source 
Variable Source 
Headline inflation Eurostat 
One year ahead inflation expectations Consensus Economics 
World commodity price inflation IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Unemployment rate gap Iossifov and Podpiera (2014) from Haver and national 
sources 
Contribution of taxes and administered 
prices  
Iossifov and Podpiera (2014) from Eurostat 
Euro Area price pressure Iossifov and Podpiera (2014) from Eurostat 
Share of foreign value added in domestic 
demand 
Iossifov and Podpiera (2014) from OECD-WTO’s Trade in 
Value Added dataset 
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Table A2. Phillips curve estimates 
  (1) 
VARIABLES Inflation 
    
Inflation t-1 -0.092 
 (0.156) 
Inflation t-2 0.272 
 (0.234) 
Price of oil 0.091* 
 (0.050) 
Price of food 0.016 
 (0.048) 
Unemployment gap -0.590 
 (0.494) 
Contribution of admin. prices -0.404 
 (0.473) 
Contribution of taxes 0.955*** 
 (0.296) 
Inflation expectation -0.257 
 (0.447) 
EA inflation 7.148** 
 (2.653) 
Constant -0.018 
 (0.016) 
Observations 25 
R-squared 0.946 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
